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Democratic governance of natural resources requires democratic accountability. To explore the ante-
cedence of public preference for marine policy instruments, this study revisit previous research findings
linking inefficient political institutions to demand for more coercive policy tools. Thus, the aim of this
study is to investigates the influence of 1) effectiveness of authorities and 2) regulatory compliance
among resources users on the public preference for marine policy instruments. A 22 between-subject
scenario experimental approach was utilised, where the effectiveness of authorities and regulatory
compliance of shrimpers varied. Respondents were asked to rank three different marine policy instru-
ment: 1) tougher penalties for noncompliance, 2) dialogue between authorities and resources users and,
3) tradable quotas. The results from the scenario experiment demonstrate that ineffective authorities
increase the preference for tougher penalties. A potential explanation for this finding is that regulation
implies less discretion, and hence regulation is preferred when public institutions are inefficient.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Political theorists are paying increased attention to the im-
portant role of the state in governing the commons [16]. Demo-
cratic governance of natural resources requires democratic ac-
countability to the people, thus challenging researchers to explore
further the explanatories of public policy preferences in common
pool resource (CPR) management.
Decreasing fish stocks due to rule violation and excessive
overfishing have challenged policy-makers to design new kinds of
policy instruments to promote sustainable fisheries. The prior lit-
erature has explored resources users' preferences for steering by,
for example, tougher penalties for non-compliance, promotion of
dialogue between authorities and resource users, and tradable
allowances [12]. There is also a large literature arguing that both
horizontal trust between resource users and resource users' ver-
tical trust in the authorities managing the resource can account for
variations in compliance with policy regimes [13–15,19,2,
21,22,24,4]. For a critical perspective, see [23].
However, marine resources belong to the public, and thereforeScience, University of
rg, Sweden.
ring),steering instruments in fisheries should take the public interest into
account [17]. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the
important role of public preferences in governing marine resources.
This means that despite the fact that public acceptance and legit-
imisation of any steering instrument is essential for democratic
governance of natural resources, less is known about the factors in-
fluencing public preferences for marine policy instruments.
Results from previous studies investigating predictors of policy
preferences in general among the public have given rise to an
interesting puzzle. Several studies show that people living in the
context of corrupt and inefficient political institutions demand
more regulation and coercive policy tools, and scholars are in-
trigued by that: [3,6,7,20]:
“why do people in countries with bad governments want more
government intervention?” ([3], 1018) The explanation provided is
that the prevalence of market failure and government failure are
highly correlated [1]. In societies where market actors generate
negative consequences, such as CPR depletion, the government
fails to provide or protect the CPRs. Facing both market failure and
government failure, people tend to demand government inter-
vention. The will to prevent the entrance of potential free riders
and to punish market actors that defect is strong1 and outweighs1 That the will to punish defecting behavior is strong has been shown re-
peatedly in experiments. People dislike defecting behavior and are prepared to
punish it even if such punishment is costly [8].
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policies [1,3].
This theory is advanced to explain cross-country variation in
demand for regulation, but there is also individual level data to
support this view. Aghion et al. [3] focus on people's perceptions of
trustworthiness in their attitudes toward the regulation of busi-
ness actors and Harring [10] focuses on people's perceptions of
trustworthiness in their attitudes toward the regulation of both
business actors and citizens in general. Both these studies show
that people with low trust in other citizens (or interpersonal
trust), low trust in market actors and low political trust tend to
prefer punishing regulation [3,10].
These are interesting and important findings, but the prior
studies suffer from three critical limitations:
1. Previous cross-section studies have been incapable of estab-
lishing causality, e.g. it is impossible to say if ineffective/un-
trustworthy institutions have a causal effect on policy preference
or if it is merely a matter of association.
2. The causal mechanism linking ineffectiveness/untrustworthi-
ness with policy preference is not put to a proper test. In survey
analysis, different trust variables are often highly correlated
[18,27]. People who perceive that implementing institutions are
trustworthy also tend to trust other people in general. In order
to say something about the effect of the tension between
market failure and government failure on policy preferences,
the effect of trust in market actors and trust in authorities needs to
be isolated
3. Trust is a multidimensional concept, consisting of different
components. According to Stern [25], ‘social trust’ is based on
perceptions of shared values, identities and experiences and
‘rational trust’ is understood as evaluations of expected out-
comes. Stern and Coleman [26] distinguish between disposi-
tional, rational, affinitive and procedural components of trust.
Understanding the role of trustworthy institutions in relation to
policy preference requires a focus on rational aspects of trust.
This is essential in order to test properly the mechanism
suggested in the prior literature, namely, that trust in this
context refers to perceived governmental effectiveness in pre-
venting defectors from entering the market.
To address the limitations in the prior literature, the aim of this
paper is to investigate the isolated influence of 1) the effectiveness
of governmental authorities2 and 2) regulatory compliance among
fishermen on the public's preferences for marine policy
instruments.2. Two hypotheses
Building on the evidence in the prior literature demonstrating
that dysfunctional authorities are associated with a preference for
more regulation [3,6,7,20] and more coercive policy tools [10,11]
the first hypothesis reads as follows:
H1. Ineffective authorities increase the preference for command-and-
control types of policy measure.
H1 is rejected if there is no significant impact by government
effectiveness on the preference for command-and-control forms of
steering. However, prior research also claims that the explanation
for the association between inefficient government intervention2 It is important to note that the focus is on trustworthiness as an assessment
of whether authorities are effective, not whether the authorities are important as
such.and demand for more coercive policy tools is the co-variation
between ineffective authorities and distrust; hence, low trust in
resource users results in a willingness to punish free riders. In
order to confront the theorised mechanism with empirics, the
second hypothesis reads as follows:
H2. Ineffective authorities increase the preference for command-and-
controls type of policy measures only when regulatory compliance is
low among resource users.3. Methods and materials
3.1. Experimental procedure
In order to test the two hypotheses, a hypothetical scenario
experiment was implemented. Scenario vignettes and related
questions were handed out to a total of 252 undergraduate stu-
dents at the Faculty of Education, University of Gothenburg. The
response rate was 91%, comprising 231 completed scenario sur-
veys. Participants were randomly assigned to one out of five dif-
ferent scenario vignettes. They were asked to read a scenario
vignette and to answer the related questions during a break in
their lecture; it took them about five minutes to complete. It was
made very clear that participation was voluntary. In addition to a
question about policy preferences (see below), the respondents
were also asked questions about their environmental concerns,
their position on the left-right political scale, and their gender.3
3.2. Experimental design
A post-test-only 22 full factorial design was utilised, in which
the effectiveness of the responsible authorities and the regulatory
compliance of Swedish shrimpers were between-subject factors
(see Appendix A for the scenario vignettes).
First, scenarios diverge with regard to the description of the
authorities. In half of the scenarios, it is stated that the authorities
have been criticised for the manner in which they have worked on
the issue of sustainable shrimp fisheries. In the other half, it is
stated that the authorities have been praised for their work with
sustainable shrimp fisheries. The vignettes thus capture whether
the fishing authorities are effective or ineffective.
Second, scenarios diverge with regard to the description of the
shrimpers. Half of the scenarios emphasised that Swedish shrim-
pers quite often practice high-grading, and in the other half of the
scenarios, it is stated that high-grading is quite rare among
Swedish shrimpers. High-grading is an illegal practice in which the
shrimper throws back less profitable catches in the hope of land-
ing catches that pay better. Whether this is rare or common
among Swedish shrimpers thus captures whether shrimpers are
complying with regulations or not. The combination of the two
stimuli rendered four different conditions, as illustrated in Table 1.
In addition to the four scenario vignettes generated by the 22
design, a scenario was distributed without any information re-
garding either the authorities or the shrimpers.4 Respondents as-
signed to this scenario comprised part of the control group.
3.3. Scenario and measurements
Respondents were asked to read a scenario vignette and then
rank three different policies in line with their opinion concerning3 In the group, 85% are women, 61% consider themselves as being on the left
politically and 29% regard themselves as very interested in environmental issues.
4 After the experiment, the respondents were informed that the provided in-
formation was not entirely correct.
Table 1
Four different experimental conditions.
Effective
authorities
Ineffective
authorities
Regulatory compliance among
CPR users
A C
Regulatory non-compliance
among CPR users
B D
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nario vignettes and subsequent questions were as follows:5
Researchers and specialists are currently estimating that the
Swedish shrimp stock is threatened by overfishing. Many experts
[also/despite this] believe that Swedish authorities are [in-
effective/effective] in combating over-fishing. Efforts to combat
overfishing are not just about the work of the authorities, but also
about what the fishermen are actually doing. The most profitable
for shrimpers is to catch large shrimp that can be sold at a price
that is significantly higher than the less sought but more common
raw shrimp. High-grading means that fishermen throw back the
cheaper catch in the hope of getting something more profitable.
High-grading is banned in Sweden because it poses a serious
threat to the shrimp stock. Calculations show that the so-called
high grading is relatively [unusual/usual] among Swedish
shrimpers. Researchers and specialists [nevertheless] argue that
new steering is needed.
In the on-going debate about fisheries policies, several different
means to achieve a sustainable shrimp fishery are being discussed.
We now want you to rank the three proposals based on what you
consider to be the most effective way to combat overfishing of
shrimp stocks. 1¼the most effective option, 2¼the second most
effective option, 3¼the least effective option.
The three different options were:
1. Tougher penalties for shrimpers violating regulations.
2. Promotion of dialogue between the authorities and fishermen.
3. Implementation of tradable allowances limiting the number of
days that fishermen are allowed to fish for shrimp and that
fishermen can buy and sell among themselves without inter-
ference from the authorities.3.4. Sample characteristics
The majority of the participants were women. Respondents to
the survey are politically oriented more to the left than a re-
presentative sample of the Swedish population asked the same
question. In addition, an analysis of responses to the question
about interest in environmental issues indicates that the re-
spondents of the survey are somewhat more interested in the
environment, than are the representative Swedish sample.63.5. Statistics
To assess the influence of the stimulus on respondents' most
preferred policy alternative, a multinomial logistic regression
model was used, which estimate the probability among the re-
spondents of choosing a particular policy as their most preferred
under control for the other preferences.5 Scenario stimuli manipulation in bold and square brackets. In the control
scenario, sentences with the stimuli manipulations were eliminated.
6 The national SOM Survey 2014: www.som.gu.se/.4. Results
As mentioned above, the respondents were given three policy
options: ‘Tougher penalties’ (command and control); ‘Dialogue’
(soft steering), and ‘Tradable allowances’ (resources user mana-
ged). Table 2 shows that the policy that was most favoured by the
respondents was ‘Dialogue’. ‘Dialogue’ turned out to be the most
popular policy alternative in all groups. Moreover, in all groups, for
all scenarios except that in which the authorities are described as
ineffective and regulatory non-compliance low (scenario C), the
‘Dialogue’ policy alternative was ranked as the best option by more
than half of the respondents. Among the four groups subject to
experimental treatment, the ‘Tradable allowances’ option was the
most popular in the scenario in which the government was de-
scribed as inefficient and regulatory non-compliance rare. How-
ever, interestingly, this option was also the most popular in the
control group, in which no information was given about either
government authorities or resource users, while ‘Tougher penal-
ties’ was the least popular option when no information was given.
The first hypothesis of this paper says that ineffective autho-
rities increase the preference for command-and-control types of
policy measure. The results obtained lend support to this hy-
pothesis. In scenarios where government authorities were de-
scribed as ineffective (scenarios C and D), 37% chose ‘Tougher
penalties’, whereas in scenarios where government authorities
were described as effective (scenarios A and B) 22% chose ‘Tougher
penalties’.
The second hypothesis says that ineffective authorities increase
the preference for command-and-control types of policy measure
only when the regulatory compliance among resources users is
low. There is no support for this hypothesis. In scenario C, 33.3%
chose ‘Tougher penalties’, less than the 41.5% who chose ‘Tougher
penalties’ in scenario D. However, even if non-compliance is rare,
almost a third chose ‘Tougher penalties’ if government authorities
are described as ineffective.
There is also an interesting dynamic between resource-mana-
ged systems (‘tradable allowances’) and command-and-control
instruments (‘tougher penalties’) when the authorities are de-
scribed as ineffective and regulatory non-compliance widespread.
In this scenario, the ‘Tougher penalties’ policy alternative is almost
six times more popular than the ‘Tradable allowances’ alternative
(41.5% vs. 7.3%). In the scenario where the authorities are described
as ineffective but regulatory non-compliance rare, the ‘Tougher
penalties’ policy alternative is more popular than the ‘Tradable
allowances’ alternative, but the difference is comparatively small
(33.3% vs. 24.4%).
It is also notable that the share of respondents who pick
‘Tradable allowances’ as the best policy is substantially lower in
the scenario where the authorities are described as ineffective and
regulatory non-compliance is widespread than in the scenario
describing the authorities as ineffective but non-compliance as
rare. Hence, compliance among resource users seems to increase
the preference for resource-user-managed types of policy mea-
sure. The differences between ‘Tougher penalties’ and ‘Tradable
allowances’ in the different scenario groups are illustrated in Fig. 1:
In order to test these findings formally, a multinomial logistic
regression model was applied to the data, presented in Table 3,
with odds ratios (ORs) and 90% confidence intervals displayed. The
table shows that the respondents in the group of participants in
the ‘ineffective authorities’ stimuli group prefer ‘Tougher penalties’
to ‘Dialogue’ 2.13 (C.I. 1.19-3.81) and ‘Tradable allowances’ 2.12 (C.I.
1.00-4.54). Put differently, this implies that respondents who were
told that the authorities are inefficient were more likely to choose
‘Tougher penalties’ as their preferred policy. Hence H1 cannot be
rejected.
Studying the effect of the compliance/non-compliance stimuli,
Table 2
The per cent (%) each policy alternatives rated as the most effective, in the four scenario groups and in the control group (number of respondents in parenthesis).
Tougher penalties for
lawbreakers
Promotion of dialogue between authorities and
shrimpers
Tradable allowances
Effective authorities/regulatory compliance (A) 20.0% (9) 57.8% (26) 22.2% (10) 100.0%
Effective authorities/regulatory non-compliance
(B)
23.9% (11) 58.7% (27) 17.4% (8) 100.0%
Ineffective authorities/regulatory compliance (C) 33.3% (15) 42.2% (19) 24.4% (11) 100.0%
Ineffective authorities/regulatory non-com-
pliance (D)
41.5% (17) 51.2% (21) 7.3% (3) 100.0%
Scenario control (E) 13.0% (6) 52.2% (24) 34.8% (47) 100.0%
Fig. 1. The per cent (%) of the ‘Tougher penalties’ and ‘Tradable allowances’ alter-
natives rated as the most effective, in the four scenario groups.
Table 3
Odds ratio and 90% confidence interval for each policy alternative being the most
favoured.
Multilevel logit estimates
Penalties vs
dialogue
Penalties vs
tradable
allowances
Dialogue vs trad-
able allowances
OR (C. I.) OR (C. I.) OR (C. I.)
Stimuli
Effective government 1 1 1
Ineffective government 2.13
[1.19,3.81]
2.12 [1.00,4.54] 1.00 [0.50,1.99]
P¼0.033 P¼0.102 P¼0.945
Compliance 1 1 1
Non-compliance 1.13
[0.63,2.01]
2.29 [1.06,4.96] 0.49[0.24,0.99]
P¼0.734 P¼0.076 P¼0.095
N¼177
Χ2 (df¼4)¼8.63
Pseudo
R-square¼0.024
N. Harring, B. Rönnerstrand / Marine Policy 71 (2016) 106–110 109there is a significant difference in the likelihood of preferring
‘Tougher penalties’ to ‘Tradable allowances’. The respondents are
more likely to prefer ‘Tougher penalties’ to ‘Tradable allowances’
(2.29 C.I. 1.06-4.96) in the non-compliance group. This lends some
support to the argument that people prefer more government
intervention when compliance is low. However, it does not by any
means fully explain why ineffective institutions generate a higher
demand for regulatory and punishing instruments, as already
shown by the differences presented in Table 3. Hence, H2 is
rejected.5. Conclusions
Decreasing fish stocks due to rule violation and excessive
overfishing have challenged policy-makers to design new kinds of
policy instruments to promote sustainable fisheries. However,
democratic governance of marine resources requires democratic
accountability to the people, and therefore steering instruments in
fisheries should consider the public's interest.
This paper investigates the influence of the effectiveness of
governmental authorities and regulatory compliance among fish-
ermen on the public's preferences for marine policy instruments.
The empirical investigation produced several interesting findings.
The most striking finding is that the effectiveness of government is
an essential component when choosing the preferred policy
measure. The empirical analysis indicates that when governmental
authorities are considered ineffective, the preference for com-
mand-and-control types of steering is higher than in scenarios
where government authorities are described as effective. If au-
thorities are ineffective, people seem to demand command-and-
control responses regardless of whether the regulatory compliance
among shrimp fishers is described as good or not. The finding is
interesting in the light of previous, cross-country comparative
studies of the association between policy preferences and in-
stitutional trust. Previous studies have shown that in countries
where levels of trust in governmental institutions is low, the
preference for command-and-control types of steering is higher,
which is confirmed by our results. However, people who perceive
institutions to be inefficient are more likely to choose stronger
regulations and more government control, regardless of whether
resource users are complying with the rules or not. It should be
noted that compliance rates do affect people's preferences but it is
something else that explains why ineffective institutions generate
a demand for more regulatory and punishing instruments. To
some extent, this questions or challenges the previous suggested
mechanism that the relationship between ineffective authorities
and the preference for command and control is explained by low
levels of trust. One explanation might be that regulation can be
perceived to imply less discretion, and is hence something that is
preferred when public institutions are inefficient. ‘Tradable al-
lowances’ and ‘Promotion of dialogue’ may need a well-function-
ing (public) framework in order to be efficient (see [5]). It has, for
N. Harring, B. Rönnerstrand / Marine Policy 71 (2016) 106–110110example, been argued that political trust is important for the ac-
ceptance of Pigouvian-style environmental taxes, since such taxes
imply a lot of discretion on the part of public institutions in setting
incentives correctly [9]. Other scholars are encouraged to explore
this effect further.
Results from this and other studies investigating public pre-
ferences for steering instruments in relation to natural resources
demonstrate the importance of considering country-specific con-
textual factors in natural-resource policy development. The solu-
tion to natural-resource depletion in countries characterised by
ineffective authorities may not be greater marketisation and a
submerged state, but the contrary. For example, since it is difficult
to find popular support for tradable environmental allowances in
western high-income countries characterised by effective institu-
tions and a fair amount of regulatory compliance, it seems even
more unlikely to find support for this kind of policy tools in the
context of dysfunctional governmental institutions and regulatory
non-compliance. As far as the results from this study are con-
cerned, advocates of the policy diffusion of resource-managed
systems to countries outside this privileged group must pay close
attention to the puzzling role of the state in natural-resource
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